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LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANIES: THE
OPTIMAL BUSINESS ORGANIZATION FOR
THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY?.
The limited liability company ("LLC") is one of the most significant recent developments relating to business organizations. 1 The
LLC is an unincorporated organization that combines the limited
liability feature of a corporation with the pass-through tax advantages and flexibility of a partnership.2 Although similar characteristics may be found in the Subchapter S corporation ("S corporation") and the limited partnership,3 the LLC offers significant
advantages over both of these alternatives.4 For example, while a
limited partnership must have at least one general partner liable
for the partnership's debts and generally may not have limited
partners participating in management, an LLC allows active participation in the management of the business by all owners with1 See Mark A. Sargent, Are Limited Liability Interests Securities?, 19 PEPP. L. REv. 1069,
1069 (1992). "The limited liability company . . . is one of the most interesting forms of
business organization developed in recent years." Id.
2 See Rev. Rul. 88-76, 1988-2 C.B. 360 (classifying Wyoming LLC as partnership for tax
purposes); see also Robert R. Keatinge et al., The Limited Liability Company:A Study of the
Emerging Entity, 47 Bus. LAw. 375, 379-80 (1992). "LLCs are non-corporate entities under
which neither the owners (known as members) nor those managing the business are personally liable for the LLC's obligations. [Moreover,] a properly structured LLC will be
treated as a pass-through entity for federal income tax purposes." Id. Although the LLC is
a unique entity, "the concept of a corporation-partnership hybrid is not a new idea." See
Joseph A. Rodriguez, Wyoming Limited Liability Companies: Limited Liability and Taxation Concerns in Other Jurisdictions,27 LAND & WATER L. REV. 539, 540 (1992). In fact, the
predecessor to the LLC dates all the way back to the last half of the nineteenth century
when Pennsylvania, Michigan, New Jersey, and Ohio enacted statutes providing for the
creation of partnership associations. Id. As one commentator has noted:
Partnership associations . . . are unincorporated organizations wherein the owners,
known as associates, are not personally liable for the obligations of the organization.
At various times, the ... [IRS] has treated partnership associations as either partnerships or corporations for tax purposes. [However,] [b]ecause many states have failed to
adopt statutes recognizing partnership associations, this form of business entity has
not attained great popularity.
Keatinge et al., supra, at 381-82.
3 See Susan Kalinka, The Limited Liability Company and Subchapter S: Classification
Issues Revisited, 60 U. CIN. L. REV. 1083, 1103 (1992). "Before the enactment of the LLC
legislation, investors who wished to achieve both limited liability and pass-through taxation would form either an S corporation or a limited partnership." Id.
4 See Marybeth Bosko, The Best of Both Worlds: The Limited Liability Company, 54
OHIO ST. L.J. 175, 194 (1993). "Overall, the LLC has obvious advantages over the S [corporation] and it is likely that the latter will pose no serious threat to the development of the
LLC." Id.
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out sacrificing the protection of limited liability.5 Similarly, LLCs
can avoid application of many of the restrictive S corporation
rules, thus providing business planners with greater flexibility in
structuring management and financial arrangements.'
5 See Kalinka, supra note 3, at 1103. "A]n LLC offers structural advantages that investors cannot achieve by forming a limited partnership."Id. Although taxed in the same manner as an LLC, the general partners of a limited partnership are fully liable for the debts
and obligations of the business. See REv. UNIF. LTD. PARTNamamP ACT § 403(b) (1985)
[hereinafter RULPA]; see also Bart J. Colli & Debra S. Groisser, 10 Points of Light on Limited Liability Companies, 135 N.J. L.J. 1035, 1035 (1993). On the other hand, limited partners in a limited partnership are not personally liable for the debts and obligations of the
partnership, but in order to achieve this treatment they are required to be passive investors. Id. If a limited partner actively participates in the management of the business, he or
she may stand to lose the protection of limited liability and become personally liable on
some or all of the debts of the partnership. See RULPA § 303(a) (1985). This provision
provides in relevant part:
[A] limited partner is not liable for the obligations of a limited partnership unless he
[or she] participates in the control of the business. However, if the limited partner
participates in the control of the business, he [or she] is liable only to persons who
transact business with the limited partnership reasonably believing, based upon the
limited partner's conduct, that the limited partner is a general partner.
Id. By way of contrast, the LLC offerh all its members limited personal liability while also
permitting them to participate in the control of the business without the risk of forfeiting
this limitation on liability. See Colli & Groisser, supra, at 1035; see also Keatinge et al.,
supra note 2, at 397. "The [control] rule has no place in an LLC, since, in the absence of
personal guarantees, creditors do not rely on the managers' personal liability."Id.
6 See I.R.C. §§ 1361-1378 (1988) (providing rules for S corporation); see also Brian L.
Schorr & Aileen R. Leventon, Limited Liability Company: An Alternative Business Form,
N.Y. L.J., May 30, 1991, at 1, 7. "The LLC is... not subject to certain restrictive S corporation rules, including election procedures and the taxation of built-in gains and passive income." Id. The S corporation is similar to the LLC in that it can effectively achieve limited
liability in addition to the advantage of federal taxation as a partnership. See I.R.C.
§§ 1361-1378 (1988). Nevertheless, there are several significant restrictions imposed on the
S corporation which the LLC is not subject to. See I.R.C. § 1361(bX1XD) (1988). For instance, an S corporation may issue only one class of stock. Id. In contrast, an LLC can have
any capital structure desired, making it possible, among other things, for groups of members to have different economic interests, and consequently, different rights to share in
profits and losses. Furthermore, an S corporation is not permitted to have more than thirty
five shareholders, while an LLC may be composed of an unlimited number of members. See
I.R.C. § 1361(b)(1XA) (1988); see also Bosko, supra note 4, at 193 (suggesting that this allows LLCs to expand into larger, perhaps more efficient, interstate companies and to engage in business ventures that require great deal of capital). Also, there is always the risk
that the Subchapter S election can be revoked or lost, thus subjecting a corporation to standard corporate taxation under Subchapter C. See I.R.C. § 1362(d) (1988). The LLC's characteristic of limited liability is not conceived through an election, and therefore, is not subject
to the same degree of risk. See Bosko, supra note 4, at 193. Moreover, an S corporation may
not own eighty percent or more of the stock of another corporation. See I.R.C. § 1361(b)(2)
(1988). An LLC, on the other hand, has no such restriction, thus making it easier for an
LLC to participate in parent-subsidiary structures. See Colli & Groisser, supra note 5, at
1056. Finally, the shareholders in an S corporation may only be United States citizens or
resident aliens, whereas LLCs have no such restriction. See I.R.C. § 1361(b)(1)(C) (1988).
With respect to tax related considerations, shareholders in an S corporation may only
write off depreciation losses and other deductions to the extent of their basis in the S corporation stock. See I.R.C. § 1366(d) (1988). By comparison, members of an LLC will be able to
adjust their tax basis to reflect their respective shares of LLC liabilities, thereby enhancing
loss pass-throughs and minimizing gain recognition upon cash distributions. See John E.
Davidian, Opportunitiesand Pitfalls in PartnershipFormations, in 1 N.Y.U. Paoc. FIFrY-
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Like the shareholders of a corporation, the members of an LLC
are not liable for the debts or obligations of the organization beyond the amount of their investment. 7 This is the protection afforded by the highly valued characteristic of limited liability.
Moreover, as an unincorporated business form, the LLC can effectively avoid double taxation and achieve pass-through tax treatment for federal income tax purposes." Pass-through entities such
as LLCs, general partnerships, limited partnerships, and S corporations are not subject to federal income tax at the entity level. 9
Rather, these business organizations pass-through income, credits, and deductions to its owners who are then taxed on their respective shares of income, as apportioned. 10 In contrast, taxation
of a C corporation" subjects the shareholders of the corporation to
double taxation: the profits of the corporation are taxed once at
the corporate level and then again upon distribution to the shareholders as dividends.' 2 Thus, if a business operates as a corporation, it will typically receive less favorable tax treatment than if it
operates as an LLC.' 3

FumRT INST. ON FED. TAX'N 9-1, 9-4 (1993). Further, there is generally no gain recognition on
the distribution of appreciated property of an LLC, but there is recognition of gain on such
a distribution from an S corporation. See I.R.C. § 311 (1988); see also Kalinka, supra note 3,
at 1107 (noting that distributions of appreciated property cause greater tax liability for S

corporation than for LLC).
7 See Brian L. Schorr, Limited Liability Companies:Features and Uses, C.P.A. J., Dec.
1992, at 30. "One of the most important features of an LLC is that, like shareholders of a

corporation, its members are not liable for obligations of an LLC beyond their investments." Id.
8 See Sargent, supra note 1, at 1073. As a noncorporation, the LLC can also avoid application of the various legal capital provisions in corporation statutes which govern the corporate financial structure. Id. This provides the members of an LLC with a significant
amount of flexibility in structuring financial arrangements. Id.
9 See I.R.C. §§ 701, 1363(a) (1988); see also Keatinge et al., supra note 2, at 380.
10 See Keatinge et al., supra note 2, at 380.
11 See Joseph P. Fonfara & Corey R. McCool, The Wyoming Limited Liability Company:
A Viable Alternative to the S Corporationand the Limited Partnership?,23 LAw & WATER
L. REv. 523, 523 n.5 (1988). The letters S and C pertain to the tax status of a corporation.
Id. More specifically, an S corporation will avoid the double taxation that is imposed on a C
Corporation. See I.R.C. § 1363(a) (1988).
12 See Ernest A. Seemann, The FloridaLimited Liability Company: A New Formof Business Association, 57 FLA. B.J. 536, 536 (1983); see also Mary Elizabeth Matthews, The Arkansas Limited Liability Company: A New Business Entity Is Born, 46 ARm L. REv. 791,
792 (1994). Corporate profits are subject to federal income tax pursuant to I.R.C. § 11
(1988). Id. at 792 n.4. Amounts distributed to shareholders as dividends are then taxed at
individual rates pursuant to I.R.C. § 61(aX7) (1988). Id.
13 See Kalinka, supra note 3, at 1084-85.
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Currently, thirty-six states have passed LLC statutes, 1 4 including Delaware,' 5 New Jersey,' 6 and Connecticut,' 7 and several
other states are considering such legislation.' 8 Furthermore, the
American Bar Association has appointed two subcommittees to
study LLCs and the National Conference of Commissioners on
Uniform State Laws is drafting a uniform act for adoption by the
states. '9
This note provides an introduction to the basic business and tax
aspects of the LLC. Part One traces the historical development of
the LLC with special emphasis on the revenue considerations that
New York must address in adopting its own statute. Part Two
examines the test used by the IRS for classifying organizations as
corporations or partnerships for federal income tax purposes and
then focuses on how this test applies to LLCs. Finally, Part Three
explores the moral hazard of limited liability, the doctrine of pierc-

ing the LLC veil, and specific problems the LLC may encounter
outside the state in which it is formed.
I.

EVOLUTION OF THE

LLC

IN THE UNITED STATES

The first state to enact an LLC statute was Wyoming, in 1977.20
The Wyoming legislature enacted the statute in response to a demand for a business organization with a lower tax burden than a
14 See, e.g., AmLz. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 29-601 to -857 (West Supp. 1993); CoLO. REV. STAT.
§§ 7-80-101 to -913 (Supp. 1993); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, §§ 18-101 to -1106 (Supp. 1992);
FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 608.401 to .514 (West 1993 & 1994); ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 805, §§ 180/1-1
to 60-1 (West Supp. 1993); IowA CODE ANN. §§ 490A.100 to .1601 (West 1994); KAN. STAT.
ANN. §§ 17-7601 to -7651 (Supp. 1992); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 12:1301 to -69 (West Supp.
1994); MD. CODE ANN., Corps. & Ass'ns §§ 4A-101 to -1103 (1993); MINN. STAT. ANN.
§§ 322B.01 to .960 (West Supp. 1994); NEv. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 86.011 to .571 (Michie
1994); OKLA. STAT. tit. 18, §§ 2000 to 2060 (Supp. 1993); R.I. GEN. LAws §§ 7-16-1 to -75
(Supp. 1992); TEx. REv. Crw. STAT. ANN. art. 1528n, arts. 1.01 to 9.02 (West Supp. 1994);
UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 48-2b-101 to -158 (1994); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 13.1-1000 to -1073 (Michie
1993); W. VA. CODE §§ 31-1A-1 to -69 (Supp. 1993); Wyo. STAT. §§ 17-15-102 to -143 (1993).
For a comprehensive discussion of all relevant state LLC statutes, see LARRY E. RoSTEIN &
ROBERT R. KEATINGE, RIBSTEIN AND KEATINGE ON LIMITED LIABILrrY COMPANIES

passim

(1992).
15 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, §§ 18-101 (Supp. 1992).
16 1993 N.J. Sess. Law Serv. 210 (West).
17 1993 Conn. Pub. Acts 93-267.
18 See, e.g., S.B. 469, 1993-94 Sess. (California); S.B. 1543, 178th Sess. (1993) (Massachusetts); N.Y.S. 27, 215th Sess. (1993-94) (New York); S.B. 74, 120th Sess. (1993-94)
(Ohio); H.B. 1719, 176th Sess. (1993-94) (Pennsylvania).
19 See Thomas E. Geu, Understandingthe Limited Liability Company: A Basic Comparative Primer(PartOne), 37 S.D. L. REV. 44, 45-46 (1992); see also Schorr, supra note 7, at 26.
20 Wyo. STAT. § 17-15-101 to -136 (1989). Similar legislation was introduced in Alaska on
April 8, 1975, but was voted down primarily because of tax concerns. See Rodriguez, supra
note 2, at 544.
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corporation, but with greater protection from liability than a limited partnership. 2 ' Wyoming businesses, however, did not generously embrace the LLC as an alternative business organization.2 2
In fact, from the date of the statute's enactment in 1977, through
1988, only twenty-six LLCs were formed.23 The slow growth in the
formation of LLCs was primarily due to proposed regulations issued by the Internal Revenue Service ("IRS") on November 17,
1980, which would have denied partnership classification to any
entity that did not have a member with personal liability, but did
have associates and joint profit objectives. 24 However, due to
strong criticism, the IRS subsequently withdrew the proposed regulations and formed a study project to determine whether an LLC
should be classified as a partnership or a corporation for tax
purposes.25
Following the IRS's withdrawal of the proposed regulations,
Florida became the second state to enact LLC legislation, and in
1982, it passed the Florida Limited Liability Company Act.26 The
statute was essentially intended as a vehicle to lure additional
capital into the state, thereby expanding Florida's economic
base. Specifically, Florida tried to attract foreign investors from
Central and South America by providing a form of business organization similar to the limitada, a foreign business organization
that, if properly structured, provides for partnership tax treat21 See Fonfara & McCool, supra note 11, at 523-24; see also Phillip P. Whynott, North
American Trade Treaty Stimulates Interest In U.S. LLCs: A Historical Update, 1 Limited
Liability Company Rep. 93-106 to 93-107 (Jan.-Feb. 1993). The Wyoming Act was a result
of the direct efforts of Hamilton Brothers Oil Company, a company which was involved in
international oil and gas exploration through Panamanian limited liability companies in
the early 1970's. Id. In the mid 1970's, Hamilton decided to try to get a similar entity
created in the United States which would provide flexibility from a business standpoint
and retain the favorable characteristics of pass-through tax treatment and limited liability.
Id. With the help of Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co. in Dallas, Texas, Hamilton drafted
legislation which was presented to, and eventually adopted by, the Wyoming Legislature.
Id.
22 See Fonfara & McCool, supra note 11, at 523.
23 Id.
24 Prop. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2, 45 Fed. Reg. 75,709 (1980); see also Keatinge et al.,
supra note 2, at 383.
25 See I.R.S. News Release IR-82-145 (Dec. 16, 1982). The IRS announced that the proposed regulations would be withdrawn and indicated that it would "undertake a study of
the rules for classification of entities for federal tax purposes with special focus on the
significance of limited liability." Id.; see also Keatinge et al., supra note 2, at 383.
26 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 608.401 to .514 (West 1993 & Supp. 1994).
27 See Richard Johnson, Comment, The Limited Liability Company Act, 11 FLA. ST. U. L.
REv. 387, 387 (1983).
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ment as well as limited liability. 28 However, as a result of the re-

maining uncertainty as to how LLCs would be classified by the
IRS for tax treatment, many Florida businesses were hesitant to
venture into this unsettled area.2 9 More significantly, as a result
of the federal tax uncertainty, no other state enacted an LLC statute until 1990.30
Finally, in 1988, these barriers were practically eliminated
when the IRS handed down Revenue Ruling 88-76.31 In the ruling, the IRS concluded that an LLC organized pursuant to the
Wyoming Limited Liability Company Act would be characterized
as a partnership for federal income tax purposes.3 2 With this increased assurance that an LLC could classify as a partnership for
federal tax purposes and thereby avoid the double taxation im28 See Bosko, supra note 4, at 178 n.18. Primarily concentrated in the Central American,
South American, and Western European communities, the limitada is a foreign business
organization that grants all members limited liability and can be structured as a partnership for federal income tax purposes. Id.; see also Priv. Ltr. Rul. 8,003,072 (Oct. 25, 1979)
(classifying Brazilian limitada as partnership for tax purposes). However, this form of business has not been widely used in the United States "because of certain restrictions on the
amount of capital and other restrictions which generally allow only natural persons to be
members." See Susan Pace Hamill, The Limited Liability Company: A Possible Choice For
Doing Business?, 41 FLA. L. RE-v. 721, 722 n.9 (1989). Moreover, some uncertainty exists as
to whether courts would respect the limited liability feature of the limitada if it were sued
in the United States. Id.
29 See Johnson, supra note 27, at 388. As of April 1, 1983, one year after the enactment
of the Florida LLC Act, only two LLCs had been organized. Id.
30 See Keatinge et al., supra note 2, at 383-84.
31 Rev. Rul. 88-76, 1988-2 C.B. 360; see also Wayne M. Gazur & Neil M. Goff, Assessing
the Limited Liability Company, 41 CASE W. REs. L. REv. 387, 390 (1991).
32 See Rev. Rul. 88-76, 1988-2 C.B. 360. The issue in this revenue ruling was whether a
Wyoming LLC, none of whose members or designated managers were personally liable for
any debts of the company, should be classified as a corporation or a partnership for federal
tax purposes. Id. The LLC in question had twenty-five members, three of whom were designated managers. Id. In accordance with the Wyoming statute, neither the members nor the
managers were liable for the debts, obligations, or liabilities of the LLC. Id. The members
of the LLC could assign or transfer their respective interests in the LLC only upon the
unanimous written consent of all the remaining members. Id. In the event that the remaining members failed to approve of the transfer, the assignee would receive only the right to
share in the LLC's profits. Id. Moreover, the LLC would dissolve upon any of the following
events: (1) the expiration of the period fixed for the LLC's duration; (2) the unanimous
written consent of all of the LLC's members; or (3) the death, retirement, resignation, expulsion, bankruptcy, or dissolution of a member, unless the remaining members unanimously agreed to continue the business. Id. Based on these facts, the IRS reasoned that the
LLC in question possessed the corporate characteristics of limited liability and centralized
management, but lacked the characteristics of free transferability of interests and continuity of life. Id. Consequently, the IRS concluded that the LLC lacked a "preponderance"
of the corporate characteristics, and therefore, should be classified as a partnership for
federal tax purposes. Id. The IRS has issued similar rulings with respect to LLCs organized
in Virginia (Rev. Rul. 93-5, December 24, 1992), Colorado (Rev. Rul. 93-6, December 24,
1992), Nevada (Rev. Rul. 93-30, April 19, 1993), Delaware (Rev. Rul. 93-38, May 24, 1993),
Illinois (Rev. Rul. 93-49, July 19, 1993), West Virginia (Rev. Rul. 93-50, July 19, 1993), and
Florida (Rev. Rul. 93-53, August 2, 1993).
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posed on a corporation, interest in the LLC was restored. Consequently, in 1990, Colorado3 4 and Kansas 3 5 became the third and
fourth states respectively to enact LLC statutes. Texas, 3 6 Nevada," Utah,3 and Virginia3 1 followed in 1991, and many other
states began work on similar legislation. By the end of 1992,
eighteen states had passed legislation providing for the formation
of LLCs.4 0
A.

New York State Revenue Considerations

In New York, LLC bills were introduced in both houses of the
State Legislature in the spring of 1992.41 However, because of certain revenue concerns, the New York Legislature recessed for the
summer without taking any action on these bills.4 2 The bills were
again considered during the 1993 legislative session, and on July
7, 1993, the New York State Assembly showed the first sign of
promise by passing the New York Limited Liability Company
Law. 43 Nonetheless, the New York State Senate adjourned without taking any action on the legislation, thereby deferring consideration until the 1994 legislative session.4 4 As of this writing, no
legislation has been passed providing for the formation of LLCs in
New York.
33 See S. Brian Farmer & Louis A. Mezzullo, The Virginia Limited Liability Company
Act, 25 U. RICH. L. REv. 789, 790 (1991).
34 COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 7-80-i01 to -913 (West Supp. 1993).
35 KAN. STAT. ANN. § 17-7601 to -7650 (Supp. 1992).

36 TEX. REv. Crv. STAT. ANN. art. 1528n, arts. 1.01 to 9.02 (West Supp. 1994).
37 NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 86.011 to .571 (Michie Supp. 1994).

38 UTAH CODE ANN. § 48-2b-101 to -157 (Supp. 1992).
39 VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-1000 to -1073 (Michie 1993).
40 See supra note 14.
41 See Schorr, supra note 7, at 26.
42 Id. More particularly, the concern is that permitting the formation of LLCs in New
York while taxing them as partnerships would lead to significant revenue loss. See The Tax
Treatment of Limited Liability Companies: Hearings Before the New York State Senate
Comm. on Corporations, Authorities and Commissions, 215th Sess. (1992) [hereinafter
Hearings](testimony of James W. Wetzler, Commissioner, State of New York Department
of Taxation and Finance); see also Lee A. Sheppard, The Dark Side of Limited Liability
Companies, 55 TAx NoTEs 1441, 1443 (1992) (noting important question is whether state
would lose revenue from permitting LLCs to be taxed as pass-through entities).
43 See New York Legislature Considers Limited Liability Company Law, OMNI CORP. &
REs. SEvcEs INC., Autumn 1993, at 1 [hereinafter Legislature Considers]. The New York
Limited Liability Company Law was to be effective as of January 1, 1994. See N.Y.S. 27
§ 1403, 215th Sess. (1993-94).
" See Legislature Considers, supra note 43, at 1.
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Revenue considerations have been the biggest obstacle to the
passage of LLC legislation in New York.4 5 The principal concern is
that permitting LLCs in New York while taxing them as partnerships would be fiscally damaging to the State and City.4 6 More
specifically, the problem is that potentially significant revenue
loss could come both from new businesses entering the State as
LLCs rather than corporations and from corporations converting
to LLCs.4 7
However, even assuming that some revenue loss would occur,
part of it would be offset by the tax costs that corporations and
their shareholders would have to pay upon conversion. 48 These
tax costs include personal income tax from any gain on shareholder distributions in excess of the shareholder's basis in the corporation's stock, and a corporate level tax on capital gains from
the step-up in basis of the corporation's assets to fair market
value.49 Additionally, an LLC law would provide New York businesses that are currently being organized outside of New York
with the opportunity to organize within the State. Presumably,
this would also have a positive effect on New York State income
tax revenues. Further, existing partnerships and new businesses
that otherwise would have been partnerships would likely become
LLCs in order to take advantage of the limited liability and organizational flexibility. 50 This would result in an increase in filing
45 See Jerome Kurtz, The Limited Liability Company and the Future of Business Taxation: A Comment on Professor Berger's Plan, 47 TAX L. REv. 815, 819 n.33 (1992). The
author states:
In some states, the major obstacle to adoption [of LLC legislation] has been an anticipated loss of revenue from various corporate taxes as new entities organize as LLCs
rather than as corporations and as some existing corporations convert to LLCs. For
example, both New York and New York City have separate taxes on S corporations.
New York anticipates few new S corporations if it adopts LLC legislation and, therefore, it is in the process of deciding how to make up for the revenue that would be lost
from fewer S corporations before adopting an LLC statute.
Id. (citations omitted).
46 See Hearings, supra note 42.
47 See Sheppard, supra note 42, at 1443. "The question of revenue loss can be subdivided
into two questions: What is the revenue effect of corporate conversions to LLCs? What is
the revenue effect of new businesses entering the state as LLCs rather than using some
other form of doing business?" Id.
4s See I.R.C. § 336 (1988); see also Schorr, supra note 7, at 33 (recognizing that Federal
tax consequences of converting to LLC may be significant).
49 See I.R.C. § 336 (1988).
5o See Sargent, supra note 1, at 1070 (noting that LLC permits business planner great
freedom to tailor governance and financial arrangements to owner's needs, while maintaining limited liability for owner); see also Hearings,supra note 42 (noting that with no entitylevel tax, movement of partnerships to LLC status could be significant).
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and associated fee revenue, also helping to offset any revenue loss
that the State might incur."'
Nevertheless, despite the additional revenue generated by corporate conversions and filing fees, if LLCs are accorded partnership tax treatment for New York State tax purposes, long term net
revenue loss could be substantial.52 For instance, New York State
currently earns approximately 98 million dollars per year from
franchise taxes paid by S corporations.53 Because partnerships are
not subject to such a tax, LLCs classified as a partnership for New
York State tax purposes would avoid this liability. Thus, if New
York strictly follows the federal tax classification scheme, under
which LLCs can achieve partnership status, this could result in a
net revenue loss to the State. 54 New businesses that otherwise
would have been organized as S corporations would likely become
LLCs to, among other things, avoid the State franchise tax,
thereby reducing the number of S corporations subject to the
tax.55 Moreover, certain existing S and C corporations would find
51 See Bosko, supra note 4, at 196. "[Elven if a state receives less corporate revenues due
to the growth of the LLC, it should also realize an increase in the overall amount of revenue
from partnership status entities, because the LLC Acts will attract business to the state.'
Id.
52 See Hearings,supra note 42.
53 Steve Zych, CorporateFranchiseTax Collections GeneralBusiness and S-Corporations
ForFiscal Years 1989-1993, State of New York Department of Taxation and Finance, Office
of Tax Policy Analysis, Tax Data Bureau (Mar. 17, 1994) (on file with author). For the state
fiscal year ending March 1992, New York State earned $102,990,000 from franchise taxes
imposed on S corporations. Id. For the state fiscal year ending March 1993, New York State
earned $93,268,000 from these franchise taxes. Id. Both New York State and New York
City impose separate franchise taxes on S corporations. See N.Y. TAx LAw § 209 (McKinney
1986 & Supp. 1994); ADMIN. CODE OF THE CiTr OF N.Y. tit. 11, § 11-603(1) (1986).
54 See Rodriguez, supra note 2, at 559. The author notes:
If a state's tax laws are based upon federal tax laws, no state corporate tax will likely
be imposed [on] the... LLC because the state will likely perform the same corporate
characteristic analysis as did the IRS. Under such circumstances, the state is not likely
to find a preponderance of corporate characteristics present in the... LLC if the IRS
failed to do so.
Id.; see also Barbara C. Spudis, Expanded Choice-of-Entity Considerations:Limited Liability Companies, ALI-ABA, available in WESTLAW, Journals & Law Reviews Database. The
author notes:
When a state imposes a franchise tax on corporations ....
an issue arises as to
whether such tax will be applied to LLCs. If the analogy to partnerships which applies
with respect to federal and state income tax is followed, such tax should not apply to
LLCs.
Id.
55 See Schorr, supra note 7, at 30. "[The proposed [New York] legislation does not adopt
complete federal conformity... for New York State tax purposes because of a concern that
federal conformity could result in a net revenue loss if entities organize LLCs, thereby
reducing the number of S corporations subject to tax in New York." Id.; see also Bosko,
supra note 4, at 196. "The basic theory is that with more businesses registering as LLCs
rather than corporations, the states' total tax revenues will decline." Id.
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it financially beneficial to convert to LLC status. 6 By converting
to LLCs, these organizations could maintain their limited liability, gain the advantage of greater organizational flexibility, and
decrease their tax liability.5 7 Consequently, if LLCs are not subject to some type of state entity-level tax or fee to compensate for
the reduced number of S and C corporations, New York may be
faced with a considerable decrease in the size of its corporate tax
base.58 In fact, the New York State Department of Taxation and
Finance has estimated that taxing New York LLCs as partnerships could result in the State facing revenue losses of 60 to 80
million dollars annually, with the prospect that such losses would
increase over time. 59 Accordingly, it is in New York's best interest
to ensure that the final tax provisions of its LLC legislation result
in a revenue neutral statute consistent with the fiscal circumstances in New York State. 0
Two possible solutions may be considered in order to minimize
or eliminate any potential revenue loss from the adoption of LLC
legislation in New York. 6 1 The first option would be to impose a
per-member fee on the LLC.6 2 This proposal would treat LLCs in a
manner similar to their tax treatment in many other states that
have LLC statutes. 63 This approach is favorable because it is a
relatively uncomplicated way of raising revenue.64 From the
State's perspective, however, a fee structure might not provide
sufficient protection against possibly significant corporate income
tax losses.6
The second option is to impose an entity-level tax on LLCs similar to the tax imposed on S corporations.66 Some of the benefits
56 See Hearings, supra note 42.
57 See Sargent, supra note 1, at 1069 (noting LLC allows for greater freedom to tailor to

members' needs while maintaining limited liability).
58 See Hearings, supra note 42.
59 Id.
60 See Brian L. Schorr, Limited Liability Companies:Featuresand Uses, 805 PLI/Corp.
191 (1993), availablein WESTLAW, Texts and Periodicals Database (recognizing that New
York statute should be revenue neutral); see also Sheppard, supra note 42, at 1444 (same).
61 See Hearings,supra note 42.
62 Id.
63 Id.
64 Id.
65 Id.
66 See Hearings, supra note 42; see also Rodriguez, supra note 2, at 559. "[I]f the state
does not follow the federal tax scheme, a corporate tax may be imposed upon the income
derived from the business activities conducted within the host state." Id. State taxation on
corporations falls generally into two categories: (1) taxes on net income derived from or

attributable to the state; and (2) excise taxes on doing business, owning property or engag-
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associated with such a tax are: (1) it would generate tax revenue;
(2) it would virtually eliminate one of the largest incentives for S
corporations to convert to LLC status; (3) certain advantages of
the C corporation will be given greater value if there is a tax price
connected with LLC status, therefore, some C corporations would
not find it advantageous to switch business forms; and (4) new and
existing partnerships that become LLCs would have to pay the
entity-level taxes.6 7 On the other hand, this option involves a
"complexity cost" to both the taxpayers and the State.68 LLCs

would have to compute a taxable income for New York State purposes which is not required at the federal level.69
By adopting either one of these approaches, or a combination of
the two, New York could minimize, if not eliminate, most of the
serious revenue concerns associated with the adoption of an LLC
statute. More importantly, the adoption of LLC legislation in New
York would be a significant step in attracting new business to the
State and in promoting New York as a competitive location for
conducting and establishing business enterprises. 0 For decades,
thousands of New York businesses have been organizing in the
State of Delaware because of New York's failure to modernize its
business laws. 7 ' As a result, franchise taxes and filing fees that
otherwise would have accrued to the State of New York have subsidized the State of Delaware at the expense of New York taxpayers.7 2 New York must begin to change the perception in the business community that it is either unwilling to meet the needs of
ing in other activities within the state. See

JEROME R. HE LIsrEiN & WALTER HELLERSTEIN, STATE TAxAToN: CORPORATE INcOME AND FRANCmSE TAXEs 7.01 (2d ed. 1993). The

tax on net income is commonly referred to as a "direct income tax," and the excise, as a
"franchise tax." Id.
67 See Hearings, supra note 42.
68
Id.
69 Id.

70 See Joint Public Hearing on Limited Liability Company Legislation: Before the New
York State Assembly StandingComm. on Judiciaryand Assembly Standing Comm. on Corporations,Authorities & Commissions, 215th Sess. (1992) (testimony of Brian L. Schorr).
71 See Frederick Attea, Wake Up Albany!, N.Y. ST. B.J., January 1994, at 44, 44 (noting
that New York's failure to modernize its business laws and eliminate certain "archaic or
anti-entrepreneurial provisions" has caused many businesses based in New York to organize in Delaware).
72 Id. The author notes:
The bottom line is that many New York attorneys routinely refuse to form corporations
under New York Law. The cost to New York... is millions upon millions. Who makes
up those millions-New York taxpayers. New York's lack of sensitivity has helped Delaware meet its entire state budget by fees derived from incorporations of businesses
that are based in New York.
Id.
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business or is unaware of those needs. 73 The adoption of legislation authorizing the formation of LLCs would be a step in the
right direction.
II.

FEDERAL

INCOME TAXATION ISSUES

When evaluating the potential utility of the LLC as a business
organization, it is essential to analyze how the IRS will classify
and treat the entity for federal income tax purposes. Specifically,
the issue is whether for federal tax purposes the LLC will be
classified as a partnership or an association taxable as a
corporation. 4
Section 301.7701-2(a)(1) of the Treasury Regulations sets forth
six characteristics that are ordinarily associated with a "pure corporation:" (1) associates; (2) an objective to carry on business and
divide the gains therefrom; (3) continuity of life; (4) centralized
management; (5) limited liability; and (6) free transferability of
interests.7 Whether a particular organization will be classified as
an association or a partnership is determined by taking into account the presence or absence of each of these characteristics.76
Thus, if an unincorporated business organization, such as the
LLC, possesses more corporate"than noncorporate characteristics,
the IRS will classify the organization as an association and treat it
as a corporation for federal income tax purposes. 7v However, since
the characteristics of associates and an objective to carry on a
business and divide the gains therefrom are generally common to
both partnerships and corporations, the IRS does not consider
these two characteristics in its determination. 8 Consequently, in
order to secure partnership classification for federal tax purposes,
73 Id.

74 See Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(a)(1) (as amended in 1993). The term "association" refers
to an organization whose characteristics require it to be classified by the IRS, for tax purposes, as a corporation rather than another type of organization such as a partnership or
trust. Id.
75 See Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(a)(1) (as amended in 1993). Whether an organization
possesses or lacks these characteristics will depend upon the facts and circumstances in
each individual case. Id. Furthermore, the IRS may consider other factors not listed in the
Regulations in determining whether an organization will be classified as a corporation or a
partnership. Id.
76 Id.; see also Rev. Rul. 88-76, 1988-2 C.B. 360.
77 See Rev. Rul. 88-76, 1988-2 C.B. 360; see also supra notes 11-13 and accompanying
text.
7S Id. In interpreting § 301.7701-2 of the regulations, the Tax Court in Larson v. Commissioner 66 T.C. 159 (1976), concluded that equal weight must be accorded to each of the
remaining four characteristics. Id. at 172.
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a properly structured LLC should lack two of the remaining four
corporate characteristics: limited liability; continuity of life; centralized management; and free transferability of interests. 79 The
following four sections will examine these corporate characteristics and consider how each relates to the federal tax classification
of the LLC.
A.

Limited Liability

One of the primary advantages of the LLC is the limited liability conferred upon all its members and managers.8 0 The Treasury
Regulations provide that an organization will have the corporate
characteristic of limited liability if, under state law, there is no
member who is personally liable for the debts of or claims against
the organization. 8 ' A member is personally liable if "a creditor of
an organization may seek personal satisfaction from a member of
the organization to the extent that the assets of such organization
are insufficient to satisfy the creditor's claim." 2
Presently, the IRS is considering whether LLCs can lack the
characteristic of limited liability. 3 Although most LLC statutes
provide limited liability to members and managers as a
mandatory rule, the Texas and Virginia acts permit a member to
waive limited liability.8 4 Presumably, if such a waiver is made,
limited liability will not exist and the members will be personally
liable for the LLC's debts and obligations. However, since limited
liability is one of the primary advantages of LLC status, the LLC
will in all likelihood be structured to possess this corporate characteristic.8 5 Business planners, therefore, will focus generally on
79 See Keatinge et al., supra note 2, at 424.
80 See id. at 385. "One of the primary functions of the LLC is to provide an alternative to

the corporate form of obtaining limited liability." Id.
81 See Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(d)(1) (as amended in 1993); see also Larson v. Commissioner, 66 T.C. at 179. In Larson, the court held that "[ulnless some member is personally
liable for debts of, and claims against, an entity.., the entity possesses the corporate
characteristic of limited liability." Id.

Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(d)(1) (as amended in 1993).
83 See Mary L. Harmon, Federal Income Tax Considerationsfor Limited Liability Companies, 1993, available in WESTLAW, Texts and Periodicals Database, PLI File.
84 See TEx. Rav. Civ. STAT. ANN. Art. 1528n, art. 4.03 (West 1994) (waiver of limited
liability must be set forth in regulations); VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-1019 (Michie 1993) (waiver
of limited liability must be set forth in articles of organization).
86 See Matthews, supra note 12, at 867 (noting that most LLCs will be structured to
possess corporate characteristic of limited liability).
82
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organizing the LLC to lack at least two of the remaining three
corporate characterictics 8 6
B.

Continuity of Life

An organization has the corporate characteristic of continuity of
life for federal income tax purposes if the death, insanity, bankruptcy, retirement, resignation, or expulsion of any member will
not cause a dissolution of the organization. 7 On the other hand, if
state law provides that dissolution of the organization will occur
upon the happening of any of these events then continuity of life
will be lacking."8 An LLC will lack the characteristic of continuity
of life even though the remaining members can agree to continue
the business after a dissolution event, if notwithstanding such
agreement, any member has the power under state law to dissolve
the organization. 9 Thus, there may be a dissolution of an LLC
and no continuity of life although the business is continued by the
remaining members.9 0
Although the IRS has recently clarified the regulations relating
to the continuity of life rule, one of the principal issues that has
not been resolved in this area is whether an LLC can avoid continuity of life if continuation of the business may be authorized by
a majority in interest of the remaining members. 9 Under prior
regulations, unanimous consent of all the members was apparently necessary to continue the business of the organization after
a dissolution event in order to lack the corporate characteristic of
continuity of life.9 2 Subsequently, however, the IRS amended the
Id.
See Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(bXl) (as amended in 1993). In this context, "dissolution
of the organization means an alteration of the identity of an organization by reason of a
change in the relationship between its members as determined under local law." See Treas.
Rg. § 301.7701-2(b)(2) (as amended in 1993).
8 See Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(b) (as amended in 1993). A corporation possesses a
greater degree of continuity of life than a partnership because its existence is not dependent upon personal events affecting its members. See Larson v. Commissioner, 66 T.C. 159,
173 (1976). Because of their close legal and financial relations, partners are accorded a
continuing right to choose their associates. Id. With respect to corporate shareholders, this
right is denied. Id.
89 See Rev. Rul. 88-76, 1988-2 C.B. 360 (providing that LLC formed under Wyoming
Limited Liability Company Act which provided that business of company may be continued
by consent of all members, lacks corporate characteristic of continuity of life).
90 See Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(bX2) (as amended in 1993).
91 See Lawrence H. Brenman, Limited Liability Companies Offer New Opportunitiesto
Business Owners, 10 J. PARTNERSHm TAx'N 301, 305-06 (1994).
92 See Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(bXl) (as amended in 1993) (noting that limited partnership which ceased to continue upon dissolution "unless remaining general partners ... or
86
87
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regulations to make it clear that requiring the consent of a majority in interest of the remaining members to continue the enterprise, rather than all the members, would not result in a limited
partnership possessing continuity of life.9 3 Although commentators have requested that the amended regulations be extended to
LLCs, the IRS has not yet expressly done so. 9 4 However, several
recent private letter rulings 95 suggest that the IRS is liberalizing
its view with respect to the application of the continuity of life rule
to LLCs. 96 For example, in Private Letter Ruling 93-33-032, the
IRS considered how the amended regulations applied to an Illinois

LLC. 97 The LLC's operating agreement provided that upon a dis-

solution event, the business of the LLC could be continued by the
written approval of two-thirds of all remaining members, so long
as they constituted a majority in interest of all remaining members.9 8 The IRS concluded that under the amended regulations the
LLC did not possess the characteristic of continuity of life,

notwithstanding the fact that dissolution could be avoided, because at least a majority in interest of the remaining members
was needed to continue the LLC following a dissolution event. 99
While this letter ruling provides some indication as to how the
IRS might treat an LLC in circumstances similar to those addressed in the ruling, it will not necessarily be dispositive in future IRS decisions. 10 0 Private letter rulings, issued by the IRS,
unless all remaining members agree to continue" lacks continuity of life); see also Kurtz,
supra note 45, at 820 n.39.
93 See Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(b)(1) (as amended in 1993); see also Kurtz, supra note 45,
at 820 n.39; John Cederberg, Continuity of Life, 1 Limited Liability Company Rep. 93-101
to 93-102 (Jan.-Feb. 1993).
94 See 58 Fed. Reg. 28,501 (1993) (noting final regulations have not been amended in
response to commentators' requests); see also Brenman, supra note 91, at 306. "Although
practitioners requested the IRS to extend the May regulations to LLCs, it did not expressly
do so." Id.
95 See Priv. Ltr. Rul. 93-33-032 (May 24, 1993); Priv. Ltr. Rul. 93-31-010 (May 5, 1993);
Priv. Ltr. Rul. 93-21-047 (Feb. 25, 1993). The IRS took the position in these three private
letter rulings that majority consent continuation agreements did not cause an LLC to possess the characteristic of continuity of life.
96 See Matthew W. Ray, The Texas Limited Liability Company-A Possible Alternative
for Business Formation, 46 SMU L. REv. 841, 855 (1992). "Although the IRS traditionally
has taken a strict approach to the unanimous consent requirement, recent private letter
rulings suggest that it may be liberalizing its approach." Id.
97 See Priv. Ltr. Rul. 93-33-032 (May 24, 1993). For an excellent discussion of the Illinois
limited liability company, see Scott R. Anderson, The IllinoisLimited Liability Company: A
Flexible Alternative for Business, 25 Loy. U. CHi. L.J. 55, 69 (1993).
98 See Priv. Ltr. Rul. 93-33-032 (May 24, 1993); see also Anderson, supra note 97, at 69.
99 See Priv. Ltr. Rul. 93-33-032 (May 24, 1993).
100 See Anderson, supra note 97, at 69-70 (noting that letter rulings do not necessarily
govern future IRS determinations).
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have no precedential value to any party other than the party who
requested the ruling. 10 1 Nonetheless, when viewed together, the
amended regulations and recent private letter rulings seem to indicate that the IRS has taken the position that LLCs may safely
provide in their articles of organization or regulations that after a
dissolution event, the business may continue with the consent of
less than all remaining members, provided that the agreement requires the consent of at least a majority in interest of all remain-

ing members. 102
Additional questions associated with the continuity of life characteristic arise when an LLC can continue to exist after a dissolution event with anything less than the consent of a majority in
interest of the remaining members. For instance, the Florida
Limited Liability Company Act 10 3 permits the members of an LLC
to provide in their articles of organization for a right to continue
the business upon a dissolution event.I0 4 Under such a provision,
an LLC would not dissolve upon a dissolution event, even though
the members did not agree to continue the business. 10 5 In effect,
the business of the LLC would continue automatically. Consequently, the IRS will likely conclude that an LLC possesses continuity of life if a right to continue is 6provided in its articles of
10
organization or operating agreement.
101 See I.R.C. § 6110(j)(3) (1988); see also David R. Webb Co. v. Commissioner, 708 F.2d
1254, 1257 n.1 (7th Cir. 1983) (noting that private letter rulings may not be used or cited as
precedent).
102 See Anderson, supra note 97, at 70.
103 FL. STAT. ANN. § 608.401 to .514 (West 1993 & Supp. 1994).
104 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 608.441 (West 1993 & Supp. 1994). The Florida statute provides in
relevant part:
(1) A limited liability company organized under this chapter shall be dissolved upon
the occurrence of any of the following events:

(c) Upon the death, bankruptcy, or dissolution of a member or upon the occurrence of
any other event which terminates the continued membership of a member in the limited liability company, unless the business of the limited liability company is continued
by the consent of all the remaining members or under a right to continue stated in the
articles of organization of the limited liability company.
Id.
105 See Ray, supra note 96, at 856-57. As one commentator has noted, a statute that
provides for a right to continue "allows the members [of an LLC] to circumvent the tradi-

tional automatic dissolution events by adding explicit provisions to the LLC's articles of
organization or regulations." Keatinge et al., supra note 2, at 426.
106 See Keatinge et al., supra note 2, at 425-26. "A right to continue the business in the
articles of organization arguably causes the LLC to possess continuity of life because it
deprives each member of the power to dissolve the LLC as a matter of law." Id.
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Centralizationof Management

An organization possesses the corporate characteristic of centralized management if any person, or any group of persons which
does not include all the members, has continuing exclusive authority to make the organization's management decisions. 10 7 The
persons who have such authority may or may not be members of
the organization and may be elected to office or selected through
some other process. 10 8 Additionally, continuing exclusive authority to make management decisions does not exist unless the managers have sole authority to make such decisions.'0 9
At present, it is somewhat unclear as to when an LLC will be
recognized as having centralized management if only a portion of
the members are chosen to be managers." 0 Specifically, the uncertainty flows from Revenue Ruling 88-76,111 Revenue Proceeding 89-12,112 and Revenue Ruling 93-6.113
Revenue Ruling 88-76 concerned a Wyoming LLC that was composed of twenty-five members, including three who were designated managers." 4 The IRS ruled, without much analysis, that
because the management of the LLC was reserved to three seSee Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(c)(1) (as amended in 1993).
See Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(c)(2) (as amended in 1993).
109 See Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(c)(4) (as amended in 1993). In a corporation, management is generally centralized in the officers and directors. See Larson v. Commissioner, 66
T.C. 159, 176 (1976). The shareholders' involvement in the managerial operations is typically limited to the election of these representatives. Id. In contrast, managerial authority
in a general partnership is decentralized, such that any partner has the power to make
107
108

binding decisions in the ordinary course of business. Id.; see also UNIF. PARTNERSHIP AcT

§ 9(1) (1992). Section 9(1) provides:
Every partner is an agent of the partnership for the purpose of its business, and the act
of every partner, including the execution in the partnership name of any instrument,
for apparently carrying on in the usual way the business of the partnership of which he
is a member binds the partnership, unless the partner so acting has in fact no authority to act for the partnership in the particular matter, and the person with whom he is
dealing has knowledge of the fact that he has no such authority.
Id. With respect to a limited partnership, managerial authority exists only in the general
partners, and a limited partner that takes part in the "control" of the business may lose his
limited liability status. See Larson v. Commissioner, 66 T.C. at 176; see also RULPA
§ 303(a) (1985), supra note 5 and accompanying text.
110 See Keatinge et al., supra note 2, at 429. "It is unclear whether a manager-managed
LLC will be considered to have centralized management." Id. On the other hand, if the LLC
vests management authority in all the members and the members do not designate managers, the LLC will lack the characteristics of centralized management. See Rev. Rul. 93-38,
1993-21 I.R.B. 4 (addressing Delaware LLC).
111 Rev. Rul. 88-76, 1988-2 C.B. 360.
112 Rev. Proc. 89-12, 1989-2 C.B. 798.
113 Rev. Rul. 93-6, 1993-3 I.R.B. 8.
114 See Rev. Rul. 88-76, 1988-2 C.B. 360; see also supra note 32 (discussing particular
facts of Revenue Ruling 88-76).
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lected managers, the LLC possessed the corporate characteristic
115
of centralized management.
It is conceivable, however, that Revenue Ruling 88-76 will not
be applicable to all LLCs with designated managers.' The Treasury Regulations provide that centralized management exists in a
limited partnership if "substantially all" the interests in the partnership are owned by the limited partners. 117 The IRS further
clarified these regulations in Revenue Proceeding 89-12,118 where

it stated that a limited partnership will generally lack centralized
management if the general partners own at least twenty percent
of the total interests in the partnership. 119 Theoretically, this ruling suggests that if the designated managers of an LLC own at
least a twenty percent interest in the organization, then centralized management will be lacking.' 20 However, the IRS has not expressly ruled that Revenue Proceeding 89-12 is applicable to
LLCs.12 1 Moreover, Revenue Ruling 88-76 does not shed much

light on this issue because in its decision, the IRS did not state the
percentage of the LLC owned by the designated managers.122 Furthermore, there are some significant differences, such as in the
area of personal liability, that exist between general partners and
LLC managers that could lead the IRS to 123
conclude that Revenue
Proceeding 89-12 is inapplicable to LLCs.

The IRS added another layer of complexity to the application of
the continuity of life characteristic with Revenue Ruling 93-6, in
which it addressed the classification of an LLC to be formed under
115

See Rev. Rul. 88-76, 1988-2 C.B. 360.
116 See Ray, supra note 96, at 858. "It is arguable that an LLC that vests its managerial
authority in designated managers may still lack centralized management under certain
circumstances." Id.
117 See Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(cX4) (as amended in 1993).
118 Rev. Proc. 89-12, 1989-2 C.B. 798.
119 Id.; see also Ray, supra note 96, at 859. "Apparently, the rationale supporting both
the treasury regulations and Revenue Procedure 89-12 is that, if the general partners do

not own a substantial interest, they must be managing the business for the true owners,
the limited partners.' Id.
120 See Rev. Proc. 89-12, 1989-1 C.B. 798 § 1.02. "Any reference to a imited partnership'
includes an organization formed as a limited partnership under applicable state law and
any other organization formed under a law that the liability of any member for the organi-

zation's debts and other obligations to a determinable fixed amount." Id. The IRS noted
that managers will be treated as general partners and nonmanagers will be treated as
limited partners. Id.
121 See Ray, supra note 96, at 859.
122 Id.

123 Id.; see also Keatinge et al., supra note 2, at 429.
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the Colorado Limited Liability Company Act. 124 The LLC in question was composed of five members, each of whom was elected as a
manager. 125 The IRS reasoned that the authority to make management decisions rested solely with the five members in their capacity as managers rather than as members, and therefore concluded that the
LLC possessed the characteristic of centralized
1 26
management.

This ruling is important because it suggests that the IRS will
never analyze the proprietary ownership of an LLC to determine
what percentage of owners are managers, if, under the statute,
the managers are acting in their capacity as managers. 127 Even
though all five members were designated as managers and had a
meaningful proprietary interest in the LLC, the IRS concluded
that the LLC possessed centralized management. 128 Consequently, it appears that any LLC that designates management
solely by elected managers will possess centralized management,
1 29
even if all of the members of the LLC are elected as managers.
D. Free Transferabilityof Interests
The final determinative corporate characteristic is free transferability of interests. Under the Treasury Regulations, an organization possesses this characteristic if its members or those members
owning "substantially all" of the interests in the organization have
the power, without the consent of the other members, to substi124 See Rev. Rul. 93-6, 1993-3 I.R.B. 8.
125 Id.
126 See Rev. Rul. 93-6, 1993-3 I.R.B. 8. Revenue Ruling 93-6 provides in pertinent part:
Under the [Colorado Limited Liability Company Act], the management of a limited
liability company is vested in managers elected by the company's members. The
elected managers may or may not be members of the company, and may or may not
include all members of the company. Members, by sole virtue of being members, do not
possess managerial authority. Although all of M's members are elected managers of M,
M nevertheless possesses centralized management, because as provided by the Act,
authority to make management decisions rests solely with the five members in their
capacity as managers rather than as members.
Id.

127 See Harmon, supra note 83.
128 See Rev. Rul. 93-6, 1993-3 I.R.B. 8.
129 See id. (noting that although all LLC's members were elected as managers, LLC still
possessed centralized management); see also Anderson, supra note 97, at 80-81 (recognizing that Revenue Ruling 93-6 is particularly noteworthy because it indicates that if LLC
designates management solely by elected managers, it will possess centralized management, even if elected managers are all members); Matthews, supra note 12, at 865 (noting
that it appears that election of managers will result automatically in finding that LLC
possesses centralized management); Harmon, supra note 83 (noting that IRS is actively
considering this issue).
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tute for themselves in the organization a person who is not a
member of the organization.' 3 0 The regulations define the power
of substitution as the ability of a member, without the consent of
other members, to confer upon his/her substitute all of the attributes of the member's interest in the organization. 131 This includes
not only the right to share in the profits of the business, but also
the right to participate in the management of the organization.' 3 2
Revenue Ruling 88-76 provides both insight and guidance as to
how the free transferability of interest characteristic applies to
LLCs.' 33 In that ruling, the IRS reasoned that a Wyoming LLC
lacked the characteristic of free transferability of interests because, under the Wyoming statute, an assignee of a member's interest could not become a substitute member and acquire all the
attributes of the member's interest unless all of the remaining
members consented to the assignment. 34 The IRS concluded that
the ability of a member to assign only the right to share in the
profits and not the right to participate in the management of the
organization was not sufficient to conclude that the LLC possessed
free transferability of interests.A35 Thus, an LLC will lack free
transferability if its members, or those members owning a substantial interest in the LLC, may not transfer their full membership rights without the unanimous consent of the other members.
It is less clear, however, whether an LLC will be held to lack
this corporate characteristic if transferability is conditioned upon
a standard short of unanimous consent of the remaining members. 3 6 For instance, the LLC might condition transfer of a member's full membership rights on the approval of a majority in inter130 See Treas. Rag. § 301.7701-2(eXl) (as amended in 1993).
131 Id.
132 See id. The characteristic of free transferability of interests does not exist where each
member can, without the consent of other members, only assign the right to share in profits
but cannot so assign the right to participate in the management of the organization. Id.
Absent consensual restrictions, a stockholder's rights and interest in a corporation are
freely transferable without reference to the desires of other members. See Larson v. Commissioner, 66 T.C. 159, 182 (1976). A partner, on the other hand, can unilaterally transfer
only his right to share in the partnership "profits and surplus," and cannot confer on the
transferee the other attributes of membership without the consent of all the other partners.
Id.; see also UMF. PARTNERSHpI AcT § 18(g). Section 18(g) provides: "No person can become
a member of a partnership without the consent of all the other partners." Id.
133 See Ray, supra note 96, at 857.
134 See Rev. Rul. 88-76, 1988-2 C.B. 360.
135 Id.

136 See Matthews, supra note 12, at 869; see also Ray, supra note 96, at 858 (noting if
LLC's regulations allow for anything less than unanimous consent, LLC could risk possessing free transferability of interests).
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1 37
est of the nontransferring members or consent of the manager.
The IRS has addressed these types of transfer schemes in several
private letter rulings.

In Private Letter Ruling 92-10-019,131 the IRS addressed an

LLC organized under the Texas Limited Liability Act, 13 9 which
allows LLCs to establish their own regulations regarding transferability. 140 The regulations of the LLC at issue provided that the
LLC's members could not transfer their full ownership interest
without first obtaining either the consent of the manager or, if the
manager was not a member or was the member making the transfer, consent of a majority in interest of the other members.141 The
IRS concluded that the LLC lacked the characteristic of free transferability of interests. 1 42 Two months later, in Private Letter Ruling 92-19-022,1 4 1 the IRS addressed a Utah LLC whose operating
agreement required the consent of a majority of the nontransferring members prior to a member's transfer of full membership
rights.'" Again,45the IRS ruled that the LLC did not possess free
transferability.

Based on these private letter rulings, the IRS appears to have
taken the position that an LLC will lack free transferability if
prior to the transfer of a member's full ownership interest, the
member must obtain the consent of either the sole manager, provided that the manager is also a member of the LLC, or at least a
majority in interest of the nontransferring members. 46 However,
because private letter rulings only apply to the taxpayer who ob137 See Ray, supra note 96, at 858.
138 Priv. Ltr. Rul. 92-10-019 (Dec. 6, 1991).
139 TEx. Rxv. Crv. STAT. ANN. art. 1528n, arts. 1.01 to 9.02 (West Supp. 1994).
140 See id. art 4.05A; see also Priv. Ltr. Rul. 92-10-019 (Dec. 6, 1991); Anderson, supra
note 97, at 75.
141 See Priv. Ltr. Rul. 92-10-019 (Dec. 6, 1991). The LLC's regulations also provided that
the interest of any member in the LLC could be transferred without the consent of the
manager or members if the transfer occurred by reason of death, dissolution, divorce, or
termination of the member, and transfer was to a "permitted transferee." Id.; see also An.
derson, supra note 97, at 75.
142 See Priv. Ltr. Rul. 92-10-019 (Dec. 6, 1991); see also Priv. Ltr. Rul. 92-18-078 (Jan 31,
1992) (another Texas LLC held to lack free transferability although substitution of member
conditioned on consent of manager or members owning at least two-thirds of ownership
interests).
143 Priv. Ltr. Rul. 92-19-022 (Feb. 6, 1992).
144 Id.; see also UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 48-2b-131 (1994); Anderson, supra note 97, at 76.
145 See Priv. Ltr. Rul. 92-19-022 (Feb. 6, 1992).
146 See Anderson, supra note 97, at 76.
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tains the ruling, business planners should still exercise caution
1 47
when drafting provisions to govern transferability of interests.
III.

A.

OTHER CONSIDERATIONS

Moral Hazard

Under the doctrine of limited liability, if a judgment is rendered
against an organization in an amount that exceeds its ability to
pay, judgment creditors cannot pursue the organization's individual members to collect the residual amount. 14 The doctrine

originated from the idea that limiting liability would promote investment by small entrepreneurs, keep the business market com1 49
petitive, and create more revenue for the small-scale business.
However, whenever limited liability exists in an organization,
there is also the possibility of a moral hazard problem. More specifically, the moral hazard present in business forms like the LLC
is the "incentive created by limited liability to transfer the cost of
risky activities to creditors."' 50
Nevertheless, the limited liability doctrine, historically, offers
several significant advantages.i 51 First, the need for investors to
closely observe their investments diminishes with limited liability
147 Id. (noting that planners must exercise caution when drafting provisions to govern
transferability of ownership interests); see also Robert G. Lang, Utah's Limited Liability
Company Act: Viable Alternative or Trap for the Unwary?, 1993 UTAH L. REv. 941, 964
(noting that because private rulings carry no precedential value, planners should not solely
rely on them).
14S See Joseph A. Grundfest, The Limited Futureof Unlimited Liability:A CapitalMarkets Perspective, 102 YALE L.J. 387, 387-88 (1992).
149 See Stephen Presser, Thwarting the Killing of the Corporation:Limited Liability,Democracy, and Economics, 87 Nw. U. L. Rv. 148, 155 (1992). The author notes:
The popular democratic justification for limited liability is rarely observed by modem
scholars. Nevertheless, it appears that to the nineteenth-century legislators in states
such as New York, who mandated limited liability for corporations' shareholders, the
imposition of limited liability was perceived as a means of encouraging the small-scale
entrepreneur, and of keeping entry into business markets competitive and democratic.
.. Without the contributions of investors of moderate means, it was felt, the kind of
economic progress states like New York needed would not be achieved.
Id.
160 See Frank Easterbrook & Daniel Fischel, Limited Liability and the Corporation, 52
U. CHI. L. REv. 89, 104 (1985) (noting that limited liability increases probability of insufficient assets to pay creditors); see also Paul Halpern et al., An EconomicAnalysis ofLimited
Liability in CorporationLaw, 30 U. TORoNTO L.J. 117, 140 (1980) (noting possibility of
"moral hazard problem" when limited liability exists); Grundfest, supra note 148, at 388
(noting that critics claim limited liability provides incentive for excessive risk-taking and
unfairly limits recoveries by plaintiffs with valid claims against organization).
151 See David W. Leebron, Limited Liability, Tort Victims, and Creditors, 91 COLUM. L.
REv. 1565, 1566 (1991) (describing limited liability as well established in capitalist law and
essential to modem corporate structure).

LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANIES

1994]

because investors will have a diversified portfolio of investments
15 2
with only a small percentage of money invested in any one firm.
On the other hand, investors subject to unlimited liability would
scrutinize their investments and other shareholders' activities
much more
closely, thereby increasing monitoring and operating
3

costs.

15

A second advantage to limited liability is that it facilitates diversification. 54 Under a rule of limited liability, investors can effectively hedge and minimize risk by owning a diversified portfolio
of assets. 1 5 5 In contrast, with a rule of unlimited liability, any one
shareholder's investment could result in a loss of his or her entire
wealth. 15 6 Consequently, diversification would be discouraged in
order to limit the potential exposure
to liability, and the cost to
1 57
firms of raising capital would rise.
Finally, limited liability allows for maximization of investments.' 5 8 When limited liability exists, managers can invest in
any project without exposing investors to personal bankruptcy. 5 9
This includes investing in riskier ventures, such as the development of new and unique products. 16 0 Since it is not economically
practical for investors to hold diversified portfolios in a world of
unlimited liability, managers in such a world would reduce risk
152 See Presser, supra note 149, at 158. The author notes that with the presence of unlimited liability, "shareholders would find it necessary to monitor closely the activities of
their corporations in order to escape liability, and that the high cost of this monitoring
would itself discourage investment." Id.
153 See Presser, supra note 149, at 158 (noting that unlimited shareholder liability increases monitoring costs). Since the monitoring costs of an organization would decrease
with limited liability, the operating costs would also decrease. Id.
154 See Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 150, at 96-97 (noting that productive diversification can be achieved with limited liability).
155 Id.

156 See Presser, supra note 149, at 161. The author notes that one of the arguments
against a rule of unlimited liability is that under such a regime," any one shareholder's
investment could result in wiping out his or her wealth, [thus] diversification would be
discouraged, rather than encouraged, in order to limit the risk of catastrophic liability." Id.
157 See Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 150, at 96-97 (noting that diversified portfolio
of assets decreases risk investor faces and therefore, companies can raise capital at lower
cost); see also G. Michael Epperson & Joan M. Canny, The Capital Shareholder'sUltimate
Calamity:Pierced Corporate Veils and Shareholder Liability in the District of Columbia,
Maryland, and Virginia, 37 CATH. U. L. REV. 605, 606 (1988) (noting that limited liability
facilitates accumulation of enterprise capital).
158 See Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 150, at 97 (noting that "limited liability facilitates optimal investment decisions").
159 See Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 150, at 97. When investors hold diversified
portfolios, managers maximize investors' welfare by investing in any project with a positive
net present value. Id.
160 Id.
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for investors by rejecting certain speculative projects with a positive net present value. 16 1 This would result in a loss to the economy and society as a whole, because by definition, projects with a
6 2
positive net present value are beneficial uses of capital.1
In sum, the various economic and financial advantages associated with the concept of limited liability outweigh any risk associated with the moral hazard problem.' 63 The limited liability concept, and consequently the LLC, allows for more efficient
diversification, facilitates optimal investment decisions, decreases
the need to monitor the firm and other shareholders, and increases the availability of capital to the firm. Moreover, the moral
hazard problem can be effectively controlled by various safety
valves such as written contracts including specific provisions constraining the actions of the firm, personal guarantees from the
16 4
owners of the firm, and by piercing the LLC veil.
B.

Piercing the Limited Liability Company Veil

One of the most important features of the LLC is that, like
shareholders of a corporation, its members are not liable for the
debts and obligations of the organization beyond the amount of
161 See Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 150, at 97 (noting that under rule of unlimited
liability, managers would reject as "too risky" some projects with positive net present
value); Robert B. Thompson, Piercingthe CorporateVeil: An EmpiricalStudy, 76 CoRNELL
L. REv. 1036, 1039 (1991). The author notes: 'The possibility that the failure of a business

would allow its creditors to reach all of an investor's nonbusiness assets might deter a risk
averse investor from investing, even though the risk is small and the investment has a
positive net present value. Limited liability encourages these investments." Id.; see also
BLAcK's LAw DicIoNARY 1041 (6th ed. 1990). Net present value ("NPV") is defined as "[t]he
present value of the stream of net cash flows resulting from a project, discounted at the
firm's cost of capital, minus the project's net investment. It is used to evaluate, rank, and
select among various investment projects." Id.
162 See Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 150, at 97 (noting that increased availability
of funds for projects with positive net present values is real benefit of limited liability).
163 See Grundfest, supra note 148, at 421. The author notes that "[for all the academic
controversy, the evidence is hardly overwhelming that limited liability causes a significant
increase in an [organization's] willingness to engage in risky behavior." Id.
164 See Epperson & Canny, supra note 157, at 643. The authors note:
[B]usiness activity... thrives, and encourages investment from a variety of sources,
where the associated risk is carefully controlled. Limited liability serves such a purpose for the American [business] enterprise. Well counseled investors will understand
that.., it is incumbent upon them to safeguard their limited liability by maintaining
the fiction, and thereby the integrity of the [business] form. The doctrine of piercing
the corporate veil serves as... [an] exception to limited liability in particularly egregious circumstances.
Id.; see also Sandra K Miller, What Standardsof Conduct Should Apply to Members and
Managers of Limited Liability Companies?, 68 ST. JoH's L. REv. 21, 78-79 (1994). The
author suggests that a standard of due care or ordinary negligence is more appropriate
than a gross negligence standard for members and managers of LLCs. Id.
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their investment. 65 However, since the LLC is a relatively new
business form, caselaw has yet to address the scope of a member's
limitation on liability. 166 Thus, the question remains as to what
extent the doctrine of piercing the corporate veil will apply to
LLCs.167 To attempt to answer this question, one must look to the

corporate form to determine when and why personal6 liability is
sometimes imposed on a corporation's shareholders.
A shareholder of a corporation, in certain circumstances, can be
held personally liable for the debts and obligations of the organization.' 69 The principal way of imposing such liability on shareholders is through the judicial doctrine of piercing the corporate
veil. 170 As stated in Carte Blanche Ltd. v. Diners Club International, Inc.,7 the general rule is that personal liability will not be

imposed on the shareholders unless they abuse their right to limited liability by using the corporation for dishonest or improper
purposes.172 Although courts do not apply definitive legal standards when analyzing piercing issues, they have traditionally fo165 See Keatinge et al., supra note 2, at 412 (noting that members of LLC cannot be held

personally liable for LLC's debts); see also Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 150, at 89-90.
166 See Keatinge et al., supra note 2, at 442. The authors note: "Because of the relatively
recent development of the LLC in the United States, there are no reported cases involving
the liability of LLC members." Id. But see Abu-Nassar v. Elders Futures, Inc., No. 88 Civ.
7906, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3794 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 28, 1991) (concerning liability of members of a Lebanese LLC).
167 See Curtis J. Braukmann, Comment, Limited Liability Companies, 39 KAN. L. REv.
967, 991 (1991) (noting that courts have yet to define degree to which piercing will apply to
LLCs); Gazur & Goff, supra note 31, at 401 (noting that issues exist as to whether veil
piercing applies to LLCs); see also Hamill, supra note 28, at 751 (noting difficulty in predicting when courts will pierce corporate veil).
168 See Fonfara & McCool, supra note 11, at 531. Corporate shareholders and LLC members are both statutorily protected from personal liability. Id.
169 See REv. MODEL BusINvss CORP. AcT § 6.22 (1984). The Act provides in relevant part:
Unless otherwise provided in the articles of incorporation, a shareholder of a corporation is not personally liable for the acts or debts of the corporation except that he may
become personally liable by reason of his own acts or conduct.
Id.
170 See Thompson, supra note 161, at 1036. "Piercing the corporate veil refers to the
[judicial doctrine] by which courts disregard the separateness of the corporation and hold a
shareholder responsible for the corporation's actions as if it were the shareholder's own."
Id.
171 2 F.3d 24, 26 (2d Cir. 1993); see Win. Passalacqua Builders, Inc. v. Resnick Developers South, Inc., 933 F.2d 131 (2d Cir. 1991).
172 Carte Blanche Ltd., at 2 F.3d at 26; see Walkovsky v. Carlton, 18 N.Y.2d 414, 417,
223 N.E.2d 6, 7, 276 N.Y.S.2d 585, 587 (1966). "[Clourts will disregard the corporate form,
or to use more accepted terminology, pierce the corporate veil, whenever necessary to prevent fraud or to achieve equity." Id.; Hamill, supra note 28, at 744. The concept of piercing
the corporate veil is based on common law, rather than state or federal statutory law. Id.
This concept is one of the most frequently litigated theories in corporate law. See Thompson, supra note 161, at 1036.
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cused on several common factors in deciding whether to pierce the
corporate veil. 1 73 These factors include whether the case involved
an involuntary creditor, 174 whether the shareholders were engaged in fraud or misrepresentation, 75 whether the corporation
176
and whether corporate formaliwas inadequately capitalized,
77
ties were followed.1

Not all factors considered in corporate piercing cases equally apply to the LLC. 78 Because the flexibility of the LLC's management structure allows it to operate without observing the type of
173 See United States v. Healthwin-Midtown Convalescent Hosp. & Rehabilitation Ctr.,
511 F. Supp. 416, 418-19 (C.D. Cal. 1981), aff'd mem., 685 F.2d 448 (9th Cir. 1982) (noting
that courts consider several factors in piercing corporate veil such as adequacy of corporation's capitalization, commingling corporate and noncorporate assets, and failure to observe corporate formalities). Whether to pierce the corporate veil depends upon the factors
present in each case. Id. at 418. Courts may decide to pierce the corporate veil when fraud
is discovered or to produce an equitable result. See International Aircraft Trading Co., Inc.
v. Manufacturers Trust Co., 297 N.Y. 285, 292, 79 N.E.2d 249, 252, 71 N.Y.S.2d 923, 923
(1948) (noting that piercing corporate veil occurs to prevent fraud or to achieve equity); see
also Pardo v. Wilson Line of Washington, Inc., 414 F.2d 1145, 1149-50 (D.C. Cir. 1969)
(noting that courts do not normally pierce corporate veil because corporation presumed to
be properly formed and operated).
174 See Braukmann, supra note 167, at 991. Courts are substantially more likely to
pierce the corporate veil on behalf of a tort or other involuntary creditor than on behalf of
one who has voluntarily elected to look solely to the corporation's credit. Id. Even a contract
claimant may be an involuntary creditor since some parties to a contract possess little bargaining power. Id. at 991 n.160. But see Thompson, supra note 161, at 1036 (noting that
more veil piercing occurs in contract cases than in tort cases).
175 See Larry R. Ribstein, Limited Liability and Theories of the Corporation,50 MD. L.
REv. 80, 111 (1991) (noting that material misrepresentation or nondisclosure may be appropriate grounds for piercing corporate veil); see also Keatinge et al., supra note 2, at 444
(noting that factors for veil piercing include "lack of separateness, inadequate capitalization, illegal purpose, equity and justice, and failure to comply with corporate formalities.");
Thompson, supra note 161, at 1063-70.
176 See Braukmann, supra note 167, at 991. Most courts view undercapitalization as one
of the most significant factors in deciding whether to pierce the corporate veil. Id.; see also
Thompson, supra note 161, at 1065 (noting that commentators cite undercapitalization as
part of normative standard in piercing cases). However, the vast majority of courts hold
that although grossly inadequate capitalization is an important factor, it is not dispositive.
See Walkovsky, 18 N.Y.2d at 419, 223 N.E.2d at 9, 276 N.Y.S.2d at 589. The corporate form
may not be disregarded merely because the assets of the corporation are insufficient to
assure the recovery sought. Id. The majority of courts require either fraud by the shareholder or a failure to follow corporate formalities before the veil will be pierced. Id. at 419,
223 N.E.2d at 10, 276 N.Y.S.2d at 590; see also Harris v. Curtis, 8 Cal. App. 3d 837, 841 (Ct.
App. 1970) (noting undercapitalization as only one factor to consider in veil piercing). But
see Minton v. Cavaney, 364 P.2d 473, 475 (Cal. 1961) (appearing to hold that involuntary
creditor may pierce corporate veil if there has been grossly inadequate capitalization, even
in absence of fraud or failure to follow corporate formalities).
177 See Thompson, supranote 161, at 1067. The author states: "[clommentators note that
courts nearly always cite disregard of formalities, and that failure to maintain formalities
substantially increases the probability of piercing." Id. Some examples of failure to follow
corporate formalities are where the corporation never formally issues shares, never holds
shareholders' and directors' meetings, and fails to distinguish between corporate property
and personal property. See Fonfara & McCool, supra note 11, at 531-32.
178 See Braukmann, supra note 167, at 992..
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formalities imposed on corporations, an LLC's failure to comply
with corporate-like formalities is less likely to create a veil piercing problem.' 7 9 However, despite this difference, courts are likely
to treat the LLC similar to the corporation with respect to piercing. Like a corporation's shareholders, members of an LLC are
entitled to participate in firm management without losing the protection of limited liability. 8 0 For this reason alone, corporate
caselaw may be appropriately analogous for LLC veil piercing purposes."8 1 Furthermore, states may statutorily mandate that courts
apply corporate caselaw to LLCs in this area. 8 ' Colorado, for example, has a statute which requires that the conditions and circumstances under which a corporation's veil may be pierced under
Colorado law be considered when a party seeks to hold members of
an LLC personally liable.'
C.

Choice of Law

The use of LLCs outside the state in which they are formed remains a consideration when choosing it as a business form.18 Despite the fact that LLCs are now recognized in thirty six states,
the question remains as to whether the limited liability status of
members will be recognized by states that have no LLC legislation. 18 5 An LLC doing business or operating in a state with no
179 See Keatinge et al., supra note 2, at 446 (noting that in LLC context, it is questionable whether failure to follow corporate-like formalities should even be factor in LLC piercing analysis). In contrast to the LLC, traditional business entities are usually required to
conform to certain operational guidelines that limit their flexibility. See Lang, supra note
147, at 961. For example, corporations generally must treat all stockholders within a class
of stock equally with respect to dividend payments and voting rights. Id.; see also N.Y. Bus.

CoR. LAw § 501(c) (McKinney 1986 & Supp. 1994). Corporations are also required to hold
annual stockholder meetings. Id.; see also N.Y. Bus. CoRP. LAw § 602(b) (McKinney 1986 &
Supp. 1994).
180 See Keating et al., supra note 2, at 445 (noting that LLC members, like corporate
shareholders and contrary to limited partners under RULPA, are entitled to participate in
management without losing limited liability protection).
'1 Id.
182 See

Braukmann, supra note 167, at 992 (noting that states can statutorily mandate
caselaw pertaining to piercing corporate veil will apply to LLCs).
i83 CoL. Rav. STAT. ANN. § 7-80-107 (West Supp. 1993). The Colorado Act provides:
In any case in which a party seeks to hold the members of a limited liability company
personally responsible for the alleged improper actions of the limited liability company, the court shall apply the case law which interprets the conditions and circumstances under which the corporate veil of a corporation may be pierced under Colorado
law.
Id.
184 See Brian L. Schorr, Limited Liability Companies: Considerations in Choosing a
Business Entity, 1994, available in WESTLAW, Texts and Periodicals Database, PLI File.
185 Id.
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LLC legislation encounters the risk of exposing its members to
personal liability for the LLC's debts, contracts, and tortious actions.' 8 6 Traditional notions of choice of law and comity must be
examined in order to determine the extent and likelihood of this
87
exposure. 1
Choice of law principles dictate which state's laws should apply
to a particular cause of action. In the case of an LLC, a court
might be faced with a situation where the laws of one state do not
recognize the limited liability status of an LLC's members. In that
situation, the court will either apply the Full Faith and Credit
Clause, the Interstate Commerce Clause, or another state's laws
based upon the public policy of the forum state.
The first choice of law principle to consider is the Full Faith and
Credit Clause, which provides that each state shall recognize "the
public Acts, Records, and judicial Proceedings of every other
State."' 8 8 In order to ensure that choice of law is neither arbitrary
nor fundamentally unfair, the application of a forum state's law to
a controversy will be sustained under the Full Faith and Credit
Clause only if sufficient state contacts exist with the forum
state. 18 9 The challenge to the limited liability status of a foreign
LLC entering another state will usually be triggered by the LLC's
business activities, ownership of property, or tortious conduct in
the forum state.190 Typically, such contacts with the forum state
will establish a sufficient state interest to enable the forum state
to constitutionally look to its statutes in deciding whether to recognize a foreign LLC, in particular, the limited liability status of
its members. 19 1
The Interstate Commerce Clause, a second choice of law principle, may also influence whether the limited liability provisions of
an LLC's state of organization will be adopted in a forum state
186 Id.

187 Id.; see also Braukmann, supra note 167, at 987 (noting that whether sister state will
respect limited liability and other state law characteristics of LLC in tort and contract
actions is question of judicial comity).
185 U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1; see also CoLo. Rav. STAT. ANN. § 7-80-106 (West Supp.
1993). Colorado's statute requests that LLCs transacting business outside of Colorado "be
granted the protection of full faith and credit under section 1 of Article V of the Constitu-

tion of the United States." Id.
189 See Allstate v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302, 310-11 (1981) (holding that state interest was
created because Minnesota had significant contacts with parties and occurrence).
190 See Gazur & Goff, supra note 31, at 435.
191 See id. at 435-36 (noting that forum states would not be precluded from looking to
their own statutes if significant contacts exist).
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without an LLC statute. 1 9 2 Specifically, the Interstate Commerce
Clause may require a forum state to recognize the law of the
LLC's state of organization over its own law in order to prevent
the risk of inconsistent regulation that would impede interstate
commerce. 193 Because the laws relating to business organizations
differ from state to state, the application of the law of every state
in which an LLC transacts business could result in an impermissible risk of inconsistent regulation.19 4 However, by recognizing the
law of the LLC's state of organization pursuant to the Interstate
Commerce Clause, the risk of inconsistent regulation would be
virtually eliminated and the ability of the LLC to take advantage
1 95
of interstate capital markets would be greatly increased.
Finally, the common law doctrine of comity may also play an
important role in determining how LLCs will be treated by states
without LLC legislation.196 Comity is the principle that the courts
of one state or jurisdiction will give effect to the laws and judicial
decisions of another state, not as a matter of obligation, but out of
deference and goodwill. 1 9 7 However, courts will disregard the doctrine of comity if the law of the foreign state is inconsistent with
the public policy of the forum state.1 98 That is, a state need not
192 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. The Interstate Commerce Clause "regulatets] Commerce
with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes." Id.
193 See Dennis v. Higgins, 498 U.S. 439, 446 (noting that Interstate Commerce Clause
limits power of state to erect barriers against interstate trade); see also Keatinge et al.,
supra note 2, at 455 (stating that Interstate Commerce Clause may bar forum state from
applying its own laws as opposed to foreign state law).
194 See Keatinge et al., supra note 2, at 456 (noting that applying law of every state LLC
transacts business in could create inconsistent regulation).
195 See id. at 456 (noting that recognition of LLC's state of organization favors LLC in
interstate market).
196 See supra notes 186-87 and accompanying text.
197 BLAcK's LAw DICTIONARY 267 (6th ed. 1990).

198 See 17 WtLLIAM M. FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAw OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS

§ 8331 (rev. perm. ed. 1987) (noting that comity is principle that forum state will enforce
rights granted by foreign state unless enforcement is "inconsistent with any statute or
public policy of the [forum] state .... ."); Johnson, supra note 27, at 401 (noting that courts
will recognize presumption of comity unless state has affirmative public policy which directly opposes law of other state). If the law of the foreign state differs from the public
policy of the forum state, especially where enforcement of such activities would be injurious
to the welfare of the forum state's citizens, then the forum state is not bound to follow the
law. See Wehrhane v. Peyton, 58 A.2d 698, 700 (Conn. 1948). Absent caselaw regarding
comity and the limited liability company, one rationally looks at comity as it applies to
other business forms. See Rodriguez, supra note 2, at 553. The author notes: "[in absence
of case law concerning the application of the doctrine of comity to a LLC, it may be helpful
to look at the application of the public policy exception to the doctrine of comity by way of
analogy to a similar business form." Id. This view suggests two possible approaches that
might be applied by a court in a non-LLC state. See Braukman, supra note 167, at 987. The
first approach is to treat the LLC based upon the laws of the state where formation oc-
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recognize another state's laws when the application of such laws
would violate its own laws or impede its own policies. Therefore,
business planners considering the use of an LLC must carefully
review the statutes and caselaw of the states where the LLC intends to do business. Only by doing so can they determine if respect for the limited liability characteristic of the LLC impedes
the public policy of those states.
In short, no specific standard exists to determine whether states
without LLC legislation will recognize and respect the limited liability status of a foreign LLC's members. Nevertheless, choice of
law principles indicate that the forum state should adopt the provisions of the LLC's state of organization unless sufficient contacts
exist with the forum state or its policies are violated. 199 Additionally, states can help facilitate uniform respect for the LLC by including provisions in their respective statutes requesting recognition by other states and offering the same recognition to foreign
LLCs operating within their boundaries.2 0 0 For example, Colorado
specifically addresses out-of-state recognition by specifying the
rights and responsibilities of a foreign LLC seeking to do business
within its state.2 1 The Colorado Act provides that, subject to the
Colorado constitution, the "laws of the jurisdiction under which a
foreign limited liability company is organized govern its organization and internal affairs and the liability of its members ....
Further, the Colorado Act contains a provision indicating that it is
the intention of the Colorado General Assembly that an LLC
formed under the Colorado Act, which transacts business outside
the state, be granted the protection of the Full Faith and Credit
curred, which is called "complete comity." Id. at 987-8; see also Downey v. Swan, 90
A.D.2d 493, 493, 454 N.Y.S.2d 895, 896 (2d Dep't 1982) (applying this approach to New
Jersey partnership association). The second approach is for a court to classify a foreign LLC
as a corporation or a partnership based upon the forum state's laws. See Braukmann, supra
note 167, at 988. This approach is referred to as "partial comity". Id.
199 See supra notes 184-98 and accompanying text (discussing factors to consider in determining whether provisions from LLC's organized state apply in forum state); see also
Keatinge et al., supra note 2, at 456 (noting that choice of law indicates foreign courts
should treat LLC as foreign corporation and apply laws of LLC's state of organization);
Braukman, supra note 167, at 990 (noting that LLC must look to policies of foreign state
before performing business in that state).
200 See Braukmann, supra note 167, at 989-90 (noting that states can build wider respect for LLC into statutory provisions which ask for recognition by other states or offer it
to LLCs formed in other states).
201 See CoO. Rzv. STAT. § 7-80-901 to -913 (Supp. 1993).
202 COLO. REv. STAT. § 7-80-901 (Supp. 1993); see also Braukmann, supra note 167, at
990.
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Clause under section 1 of article IV of the United States Constitution.2 °3 Although such a provision does not ensure that courts of
other states will recognize the limited liability status of an LLC's
members, it at least makes clear the precise intention of the state
legislature.20 4 From a practical viewpoint, however, until the uncertainty diminishes, the decision to use an LLC in a state that
does not statutorily recognize LLCs should be approached cautiously on a case-by-case basis. Business planners should carefully weigh the risks inherent in the particular business, the client's need for limited liability, the amount of contacts with the
foreign state, and the public policies of the foreign state.
CONCLUSION

Although a relatively recent development, the LLC presents an
exciting new alternative to the corporate or partnership form of
doing business. In addition to limited liability and partnership
tax treatment, the LLC offers the business planner a significant
amount of flexibility in structuring governance and financial arrangements. However, despite its appealing characteristics, the
LLC still faces certain obstacles. In particular, if members are not
cautious when structuring the LLC, the IRS may tax the organization as a corporation rather than as a partnership. To achieve
partnership tax treatment, business planners must structure the
LLC to lack two of the four characteristics indigenous to corporations: (1) limited liability; (2) centralization of management; (3)
continuity of life; and (4) free transferability of interests. If this is
not accomplished, the entity will be classified as a corporation for
federal income tax purposes. Further, certain unresolved issues
such as recognition of the LLC in states without LLC legislation
and the extent to which the doctrine of piercing the veil will apply
raise important questions as to when members can become personally liable. Most of these uncertainties, however, have arisen
because of the LLC's limited use up to this time and the lack of
caselaw to guide business planners. Thus, as additional states
adopt LLC statutes and the courts address some of the fundamental legal issues, many of these obstacles will be overcome and the
203 See CoLO. REv STAT. § 7-80-106 (Supp. 1993).
204 See Braukmann, supra note 167, at 991 (noting that such provision makes intention
of Colorado legislature clear and so should facilitate judicial comity).
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LLC will emerge as the optimal solution to one of the most vexing
structural dilemmas in business: maximizing favorable tax treatment while minimizing personal liability.
Scott Kapusta & Brian Nichols

